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The adoption rate of building energy standards in the US has been increasing since the mid-
1990s as a result of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct). However, most of the evidence on the
energy savings that accrue from commercial building energy standards is based on engineering
simulations, which do not account for realized behavior once a standard is actually adopted.
This paper uses plausibly exogenous variation in commercial building energy standard adoptions,
combined with a unique state-level dataset on electricity consumption, energy prices, and the
prevalence of “plus-utilities” tenancy contracts in commercial buildings, to estimate the realized
electricity consumption response to commercial energy codes. The results suggest that in states
with a large fraction of post-EPAct new construction under a code, per capita commercial
electricity consumption is lower by about 13%. In addition, a one percentage point increase in
the rate of tenancy contracts where tenants pay directly for energy utilities is associated with a
1% decrease in per capita electricity demand. The realized energy savings are less than half of
predicted simulated savings.
JEL classification: Q20, Q42, Q48,
Keywords: Energy Efficiency; Energy Consumption; Regulation
∗Financial support from the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council is gratefully acknowledged.
I thank Joel Bruneau, Chuck Mason, Martino Pelli, Nic Rivers, and Brandon Scheifele for helpful comments and
suggestions. The paper also benefitted from comments at presentations at the University of Ottawa and the Canadian
Resource and Environmental Economists’ study group. Any errors are my own.
†Department of Economics, Carleton University, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, Canada, K1Z 1C1 E-mail:
maya.papineau@carleton.ca.
1. Introduction
Direct regulatory approaches to reducing energy-related pollution are politically popular avenues
to federal energy policy, as recently exemplified by the Environmental Protection Agency’s coal-
fired power plant standard (EPA (2013)), and the Government of Canada’s regulatory approach to
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) reductions (GOC (2013)). Several recent national and sub-national envi-
ronmental legislation efforts incorporate regulations explicitly aimed at improving the stringency
of building energy standards. These include California’s Global Warming Solutions Act (A.B. 32
(2006)), the American Clean Energy and Security Act (H.R. 2454 (2009)), and the widespread
implementation of state and provincial energy standards (Ontario (2012), GOC (2011)). Multi-
ple studies have attempted to quantify the realized electricity demand impact of energy efficiency
investments induced from utility demand-side management (DSM) programs, such as free energy
audits, subsidized financing and other similar incentives for the purchase of energy efficient equip-
ment (Fickett et al. (1990), Joskow and Marron (1992), Nadel (1992), Parformak and Lave (1996),
Horowitz (2004), Horowitz (2004), Auffhammer et al. (2008), Arimura et al. (2012)). However,
the literature evaluating the impact of building energy standards on energy demand is surprisingly
sparse, and thus far no studies have assessed the impact of energy standards on realized aggregate
commercial sector energy use.1
The prevalence of multi-tenancy structures in the commercial sector creates unique challenges
in identifying the effect of energy codes on electricity use. Estimates suggest up to 70 percent of
commercial space is non-owner occupied, and up 50 percent of tenancy contracts are structured to
shield tenants from facing energy price volatility (Levinson and Niemann (2004), Papineau (2013)).
Combined with the potential for a rebound effect in response to energy efficiency improvements,
there remains an important gap in our ability to evaluate the benefits of these building energy
standards at a time when their application by governments is increasing. As shown by Jessoe
1Two recent studies estimate the impact of building energy standards on residential energy demand (Aroon-
ruengsawat et al. (2012), Jacobsen and Kotchen (2013)), and a recent study by Arimura et al. (2012) controls for
an aggregate index of commercial and residential building energy standard adoptions in order to analyze the cost-
effectiveness of DSM. However, while the approach in the latter study attempts to address the endogeneity of DSM
spending using a non-linear GMM framework, they do not address the potential endogeneity of energy standard
adoptions. More generally, it should be noted that Arimura et al. (2012) do not assess the potential for weak iden-
tification in their non-linear GMM IV approach. Given that no weak identification statistics are presented and their
IV estimates are virtually identical to the OLS results, the IV results may be biased by a weak correlation between
their instruments and electricity demand (Bound et al. (1995), Stock et al. (2002)).
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and Rapson (2013), commercial sector consumers exhibit inelastic demand when exposed to price
interventions, which may be due to unobserved contractual structures between owners and tenants
dampening the transmission of price signals to energy users. Yet thus far the effect of tenancy
contracts on energy use has not been addressed in the energy efficiency policy evaluation literature.
This paper makes three distinct contributions to the existing literature. First, the analysis
focuses exclusively on the impact of commercial building energy standards on realized electricity
consumption in the U.S., the only study to do so thus far. Second, the paper makes use of a
unique data source to develop a state-level indicator of the rate of owner-paid utility bills in the
commercial sector over time, to assess whether shielding tenants from energy price volatility affects
commercial electricity demand. Third, exogenous variation in building energy standard adoptions
as a result of the Energy Policy Act (EPAct) of 1992 is used to identify the impact of energy
standards on electricity demand. Exploiting the variation in building energy code stringency in
states that complied with EPAct results in a sample in which states are indistinguishable on the
basis of observable covariates. States that were early movers in undertaking voluntary policies
to adopt building energy standards, as well as states that have never adopted a building energy
standard, differ significantly from states that were induced to adopt a standard as a result of the
1992 EPAct.2 An advantage of this identification strategy is that it circumvents any concerns with
respect to weak instruments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses background information on
energy standard development in the U.S., and explains why the EPAct mandate is a desirable source
of variation to exploit. Section 3 presents an overview of the data sources. Section 4 presents the
empirical model and discusses the identification strategy. Section 5 discusses the results, and Section
6 concludes.
2.Empirical Setting
2.1 The 1992 Energy Policy Act
A primary objective in evaluating the impact of energy standards on electricity consumption is
addressing the endogeneity between state-level standard adoptions and energy use. Building energy
2For example, early adopter states have significantly lower pre-existing per capita electricity consumption levels
and much higher electricity prices than states that have never adopted a building standard
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standard adoptions at the state level may be correlated with other unobserved demand shocks, as
exemplified in Table 3 by the fact that early voluntary adopter states tended to have both lower
energy consumption and higher energy prices. However, a number of administrative features of a
compulsory adoption mandate proceeding from the 1992 Energy Policy Act (EPAct) render post-
EPAct energy standard adoptions attractive for study.
The first national energy standard (Standard 90-1975) was published in 1976 by the American
Society of Heating, Refrigeration and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) as a response to the
patchwork of local, state and federal energy conservation policies being placed on the building de-
sign and construction industries. The goal at the time was to provide a document with uniform
guidance on energy conservation in buildings that could be adopted by jurisdictions wishing to reg-
ulate buildings’ energy conservation characteristics. However, while a handful of states voluntarily
adopted Standard 90-1975, the building industry and other local-level stakeholders charged with
implementing the standard found it highly difficult to apply in practice, due to its inflexible options
for achieving compliance, and lack of technical support Shankle et al. (1994).
Concurrent with ASHRAE’s publication of Standard 90-1975, the Department of Energy (DOE)
was mandated by the Energy Conservation Standards for New Buildings Act of 1976 to develop
standards that would be implementable by all new buildings. DOE’s efforts to promulgate its
own standard, in 1979, were also stymied by the building industry, which viewed the standards
development process as having proceeded without their input and relying too much on a complex,
abstruse, and expensive computer program.
After encountering setbacks in the these early attempts at a widely accepted, uniform building
energy standard to be adopted across the U.S., in 1982 ASHRAE and the DOE’s Building En-
ergy Standards Program joined forces with experts in building design, construction, and building
energy simulation fields to develop a revised national standard that could be widely accepted by
local building regulators. The emphasis was on developing separate standards for residential and
commercial buildings that offered cost-effective design strategies and allowed flexibility in achieving
compliance across a wide range of building designs. In 1985 a new draft commercial standard was
published, and several years of collaboration and revision followed, which resulted in the publica-
tion of ASHRAE standard 90.1-1989 (Standard 1989), in December 1989. Publication of Standard
1989 was followed by a demonstration phase to establish and promote the standard to the building
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industry.
This process culminated in passage of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct), which instituted
Standard 1989 as a mandatory energy standard to be adopted by all states. The requirement to
adopt standard 1989 at the state-level put in motion a new phase in the implementation process,
shifting the focus from design and demonstration to undertaking legislative and regulatory actions
at the state-level in order to achieve adoption. The energy code legislation process at the state-level
has involved some combination of public hearings and commentary, approval by advisory bodies
composed of building industry representatives, and signature by a governor, mayors, and/or other
elected officials.
States were given until the end of 1994 to demonstrate compliance with the EPAct mandate,
to allow time for training code enforcement officials and other members of the building industry
(Hatrup (1995)). However, the large number of stakeholders involved in each step of the adoption
process has caused large variations in the speed with which a state has been able to comply with the
EPAct mandate. In many states, building industry representatives argued that a mandatory energy
code would impose costs in excess of any energy-saving benefits. Such industry pressure successfully
resulted in significantly delayed adoptions in a number of states that intended to comply with the
EPAct, including Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, New Mexico, Nebraska, Pennsylvania,
and Texas, among others.
In Idaho, a bill to adopt ASHRAE 1989 was vetoed by the Governor in 1997 and subsequently
voted down by the state senate in 1998 (BCAP (1997), BCAP (1998)). The bill was redrafted and
taken up by the legislature again and finally signed into law in 2002. In Pennsylvania, an act to adopt
ASHRAE 1989 failed to pass the state senate in 1996. The legislation was reintroduced in 1997,
delayed in committee until the fall of 1998, and failed to pass once again. In 2000, Pennsylvania’s
Department of Labor and Industry began a new rule-making effort to adopt a standard, including
public hearings on a draft energy standard bill, an effort to develop an energy inspector certification
system, and a DOE technical request to evaluate the draft bill. The final draft bill was finalized in
mid-2001, followed by publication of the proposed regulations in 2002 and another series of public
hearings. A final version of the bill was agreed upon in late 2003 and went into effect in the spring
of 2004 (BCAP (1997), BCAP (1998) BCAP (2000), BCAP (2002) BCAP (2003), BCAP (2004)).
To circumvent repeated legislative and regulatory delays brought about by the building indus-
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try, several states commissioned DOE reports to determine whether cost-effective savings could be
achieved in settings specific to their states’ climate conditions, which also contributed to increased
lag times between intended and actual adoptions (Cort et al. (2002a), Cort et al. (2002b), Cort and
Belzer (2002), Winiarski et al. (2003), Cort et al. (2004)).3
Subsequent versions of standard 90.1 were approved in 1999, 2004, 2007, and 2010. Each new
version is associated with increased energy savings compared to its predecessor, and after demon-
stration phases the DOE has issued determinations for each standard version, certifying them as
achieving cost-effective improvements across the U.S., thereby triggering mandates for states to
adopt these more stringent versions.
The post-EPAct federal mandate to adopt an up-to-date building standard, in combination with
substantial heterogeneity induced by the regulatory process in states attempting to comply with
the mandate, leads to a source of exogenous variation that can be exploited to identify the effect
of commercial building standards on electricity use. Thirty-three states have adopted an energy
standard as a result of the EPAct mandate.
While I have argued above that EPAct-induced energy standard adoptions are a plausibly ex-
ogenous source of variation to study the impact of energy standards on commercial electricity use in
thirty-three states, the same case cannot be made in fourteen other states. As illustrated in Figure 2,
several states were early voluntary adopters of ASHRAE 1989, whereas others have never complied
with the EPAct mandate. The latter category includes “home-rule" states in which state-level leg-
islative or regulatory authorities are not legally able to enforce standards in municipal jurisdictions.
In home-rule states, this unique legal setting has led multiple individual municipalities to voluntary
adopt standards at different times. Since a causal interpretation of the impact of energy standards
on electricity demand can only be estimated for “complier” states that were induced to adopt as
standard as a result of the EPAct mandate, as shown by Angrist et al. (1996), the identification
strategy elaborated in section 4 discards early adopter and never adopter states.
2.2 Tenancy Contract Structure
Building-level tenancy contracts stipulate whether whether tenants pay directly for their utility
bill or if utility payments are included in rent and therefore paid by building owners. Two broad lease
3Previous DOE reports were based on national-level savings.
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types can be identified: Gross leases and net leases. In a gross lease, tenants pay a predetermined
rate that includes space rent and building operating expenses (including utilities). Gross leases
may include escalation clauses that allows landlords to audit future building expenses and mandate
tenants pay a prorated share of building-level expense increases (Jaffee et al. (2012)). Therefore,
in gross leases, because any increases in rent due to higher building expenses are shifted to future
periods and are prorated among all building occupants, total expenses are effectively independent
of a given tenant’s realized energy usage in any given billing period. In a net lease, tenants pay
their electricity bill directly, and in some cases natural gas.
Since tenants are directly responsible for their own energy bills, net contracts are considered
to be superior at incentivizing tenants to limit their energy use (Levinson and Niemann (2004)).
However, data from the CoStar database, the largest database tracking tenancy contracts in the
U.S. (see www.Costar.com), suggest that on average, only 50% of lease contracts involve tenants
paying their own utility bills. Several factors have limited the prevalence of net lease structures
in commercial buildings. First, while net contracts require individual (or “direct”) metering of ten-
anted spaces, separate sub-metering can cost several thousand dollars to install (National Science
and Technology Council (2011)), and legislation in many states restricts the ability of landlords to
pass on sub-metering costs to their tenants. In certain jurisdictions owners have also been prohib-
ited from retrofitting buildings with submeters due to consumer protection legislation. For example,
Connecticut only changed its state legislation to allow owners to submeter and charge tenants for
their individual energy use in July of 2013. Oklahoma and Georgia enacted legislation to allow sub-
metering in 1999 and 2000, respectively, and Kansas was also a relatively late adopter of legislation
to allow submetering, in 2003. Nine states explicitly do not allow landlords to charge tenants for
submetering cost markups over the time period under consideration in this paper: Utah, Illinois,
Indiana, Maryland, Missouri, Texas and Washington (Utility Management and Conservation Asso-
ciation (2014)). The EPAct sample states that have seen new legislation which eases submetering
rules have relatively large measured growth rates in their net contract share between 1993 and 2010.
These include Utah (20% growth), Texas (18% growth), South Carolina (10% growth), Georgia (9%




Data on total annual commercial electricity consumption (in billion BTUs), average annual com-
mercial sector electricity prices (in cents/kWh), and average annual commercial natural gas prices
(in $ per thousand cubic square feet), were obtained for each state from the Energy Information
Administration for the years 1990-2010. The electricity consumption figures were converted to per
capita consumption using total population data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (BEA
(2013)). For purposes of comparison, the consumption data were also divided by the total state-level
population of service workers (also from the BEA), which may be more representative of per capita
electricity demand for the commercial sector.
Commercial building code adoptions in the post 1990 time-frame were obtained from a number
of sources. These include an online database maintained by the Building Codes Assistance Project
(hereafter BCAP) (BCAP (2013)); archives of BCAP’s bi-monthly newsletters going back to 1997,
obtained by e-mail from BCAP staff; the Department of Energy’s online energy codes database (De-
partment of Energy (2013)), two documents prepared by Department of Energy staff (Department
of Energy (1996), Hatrup (1995)), and one report from the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment (HUD (1997)). Figure 2 presents the state-by-year variation in building energy standard
adoptions across the U.S.
These data were used to create a variable capturing the effect of building standards on energy
use. Energy use reductions due to standards are increasing in both the share of construction subject
to a standard and the stringency of the applicable standard. To account for the fact that energy
standards only apply to new construction, the energy code treatment was constructed as follows.
The share of the value of new nonresidential construction since 1993 that was constructed under
an energy code was interacted with a dummy variable equal to one if the state has adopted an
energy standard as a result of EPAct. This variable is named the construction share variable
hereafter. Annual state-level data on the value of new nonresidential construction is available from
4For example, in Utah recent legislative action clarified that a municipality may not interfere with a landlord’s
ability to contract with a tenant regarding who is responsible for the cost of utilities. In Georgia, a law was passed in
2000 that specifically allows sub metering programs, and in Texas the state energy agency specifically addressed sub
metering in the early 2000s, clarifying that it is allowed (though charging fees for sub metering costs are not allowed).
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the Census Bureau (U.S. Census (2013)), and the data series was converted to constant 2009 US$
using the Producer Price Index for all commodities.5 An additional variable was calculated to
capture the relative stringency of state-level codes in place. This ‘intensity’ variable varies from
zero to one, to capture increases in the stringency of a code (which the EPAct also mandated). Initial
code adoptions under EPAct were of the ASHRAE 1989 standard, with three subsequent updates
observed in the time span of the data: IECC 2000, ASHRAE 1999, and ASHRAE 2004. Simulation
studies have estimated the energy savings attributable to each new standard version, with estimates
ranging from four to twelve percent relative to the previous code version (Hadley and Halverson
(1993); Department of Energy (2002); Department of Energy (2008)). On average, a commercial
building constructed to satisfy ASHRAE 1980 standard saves twelve percent in energy use per square
foot relative to a building constructed under ASHRAE 1989. Similarly, the IECC 2000 is associated
with a saving of four percent relative to ASHARE 1989; ASHRAE 1999 is associated with an eight
percent average saving relative to ASHRAE 1989; and ASHRAE 2004 is associated with an eleven
percent average saving, relative to ASHRAE 1999. Accordingly, the intensity variable ranges from
0 to 0.34, to 0.46, to 0.68, to 1 to capture the share of the total increase in stringency from no
standard to ASHRAE 2004.6
As discussed in Section 2.2, a common assumption is that net contracts incentivize tenants
to conserve energy compared to utilities-included, or ‘gross’, contracts, but empirical estimates
of the precise magnitude of the effect are scarce. To measure this effect, I use information on
tenancy contract structure obtained from CoStar, a multiple listing service that has been tracking
the commercial real estate industry since the early 1980s. While CoStar is a private company
that operates primarily as a service to advertise buildings for sale or commercial space for rent,
it has accumulated a large database of detailed hedonic characteristics on industrial, office, and
retail buildings in the US. This database includes cross-sectional information on tenancy contract
structure in 185,192 commercial buildings across the U.S. The CoStar data also includes a time series
for rent contract observations for about 10% of the dataset, and it suggests that at the building-
level, tenancy contract structures have remained more or less constant over the observed sample
5The variable is constructed relative to 1993 because the value of nonresidential construction data series has only
been published since 1993.
6Twelve percent represents 34.3% of the total savings, which is why the intensity variable associated with ASHRAE
1989 takes on value 0.34. Four percent represents 11.4 percent of the total, so the IECC 2000 dummy is 0.46, and so
on up to ASHRAE 2004.
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period. The variable of interest is the share of state-level net contracts between 1993-2010, in other
words the percentage of tenancy contracts in which tenants pay their own utility bills. The share
of net contracts in year t (t=1993, 1994,...,2010) is measured by the share of net contracts observed
in buildings constructed up to year t.7 This approach was used since it maximizes the number of
observations used to make the calculation. Nevertheless, this may induce measurement error to the
extent that contract types change in existing buildings over the sample period. A robustness check
and estimate of attenuation bias due to measurement error is performed in Section 5 below.
Other data included as controls in the analysis are state-level per capita personal income (BEA
(2013b)), deflated to constant 2009$ using the consumer price index, from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS (2013)). To account for the impact of weather on electricity demand, data on state-
level heating and cooling degree days were obtained from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA (2013)). To account for the effect of demand-side management (DSM)
spending, cumulative state-level DSM spending per customer is also included, from the Energy
Information Administration.
Figure 1 illustrates patterns of regional commercial electricity consumption between 1993 and
2010, for both consumption per capita and per service worker. With the exception of the western
region, electricity use has been on an upward trend over this time frame, though the midwest and
northeast exhibit a modest slowdown starting in 2005.
As shown in Figure 2, several states adopted ASHRAE 1989 before the EPAct mandate became
binding, and some states have never complied with the EPAct mandate. Table 2 shows summary
statistics for the EPAct sample, separated between high intensity and low intensity states to illus-
trate that although some states complied with the EPAct mandate later than others due to legal
delays and variation in state-level regulatory processes, there is a high degree of overlap between
states’ explanatory variables.8 The explanatory variables in Table 2 indicate a high degree of overlap
among high and low intensity states as shown by the normalized differences in the last column.9 A
normalized difference of less than 0.25 is typically considered good overlap (Imbens and Wooldridge
(2009)), and the minimum and maximum values of the explanatory variables indicates the support
7For example, the share of net contracts in 1995 is measured by the percentage of net contracts in buildings
constructed between 1717 (the oldest building in the database), and 1995.
8High intensity states are defined as states that adopted a standard effective before 2001, whereas low intensity
states adopted a standard after 2001 (inclusive).
9The same characteristics are observed if the sample is limited to averages from the mid 1990s.
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of the high and low intensity distributions are approximately the same.
The treatment variable of interest, on the other hand, is substantially different between the
high and low intensity states: the share of the value of new construction put in place since 1993
and building code stringency variables are significantly higher in the high intensity states, with
normalized differences of 1.12 and 0.34, respectively. This is a reflection of the high degree of
variation in the treatment variables, as illustrated in Figures 3, 4, and 5. The top panel of Figure
3 shows the time series for the share of new construction under an energy standard across the
set of EPAct states, and the bottom panel shows the series for selected states. As shown in the
bottom panel, Georgia, Iowa and Arkansas were relatively early adopters, whereas Texas, Illinois
and Michigan were later adopters. This variation in adoption dates induced by regulatory processes
at the state level (as discussed in Section 2), has resulted in significant variation in the value share
of post-EPAct construction value in 2010, shown in Figure 4. Similar variation in the intensity of
post-EPAct energy standard adoptions can be observed in Figure 5.
In contrast, the early adopter and never adopter states exhibit significantly different character-
istics. Perhaps most importantly, average electricity consumption is 30% lower in the early adopter
states relative to the never-adopters, electricity prices are almost 40% higher, and natural gas prices
are 20% higher. In addition, note that in Table 2 DSM spending per customer in the early adopter
states is 7 times greater than in the never-adopter states, whereas it is 4 times greater in the high
intensity states relative to the low intensity states in Table 1 (which points to the importance of
controlling for DSM spending in the analysis).
Figure 6 illustrates state-by-year variation in the share of net contracts, using CoStar data.
The data depict significant variation both across states and within states over time. Some states,
such as Michigan, New Hampshire, and North Carolina, have seen the net contract share remain
relatively constant, whereas other states have seen marked increases in the share of net contract
buildings, including Louisiana, Nevada, and Iowa. Some states have also seen a slight decline in the
net contract share, including Delaware and Arkansas.
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4.Empirical Model
The following model is estimated:
log(Qit) = β1peit + β2p
ng
it + β3nit + β4cddit + β5hddit + β6Codeit + β7Intensit + β8Netit + ρi + γt + εit, (1)
where Qit is either per capita or per service worker commercial electricity consumption (in million
BTUs) in state i and year t; peit and p
ng
it are electricity and natural gas prices, respectively; CDDit
measures cooling degree days and HDDit heating degree days; and nit is real per capita income (in
thousands). Codeit is the share of the value of new nonresidential construction since 1993 completed
under an energy standard, and Intensit measures the stringency of the standard in place at time
t. Stringency ranges from 0 for states that have not adopted ASHRAE 1989, 0.25 for states that
have implemented ASHRAE 1989, 0.5 for states that have implemented the IECC 2000, 0.75 for
states that have implemented ASHRAE 1999, and 1 for states that have implemented ASHRAE
2004. Netit measures the share of state-level net contracts over time.
The γt term is an annual fixed effect that controls for time-specific shocks that apply to all
states, and ρi is a state-level fixed effect that controls for time-invariant state-specific heterogeneity.
4.1. Identifying Assumptions
This paper aims to identify the effect of EPAct-induced commercial energy standard adoptions
on state-level commercial electricity consumption. The key identifying assumption is that εit ∼
iid(0, σ2) after controlling for time and state fixed effects. In addition, energy standards must be
assumed to be as good as randomly assigned to states, which implies that standard adoptions must
be orthogonal to random unobservable demand shocks. To satisfy this latter assumption, the sample
is limited to states that adopted an energy standard as a result of the EPAct standard, which implies
discarding early voluntary adopters and never-adopters.
5.Results
Columns (1) through (9) in Table 4 present results from estimating different specifications of
equation (1) on the EPAct sample. Column (10) shows results solely for the never and early
adopters. Column (1) does not include the treatment variables but controls for state and time fixed
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effects. All the variables have the expected signs: the electricity (own) price elasticity is -0.25,
the natural gas (cross) price elasticity is 0.04 and the income elasticity is 0.42, where all three are
measured at the sample mean. An increase in cooling degree days by one unit is associated with
approximately a 0.10% increase in electricity demand, whereas an increase in heating degree days by
one unit is associated with a 0.02% decrease in electricity demand. Both these signs are in line with
expectations since cooling degree days are associated with an increase in air-conditioning load, an
electricity-intensive activity, whereas heating degree days imply an increase in (typically) natural-gas
intensive heating and less chance of air-conditioner use. Commercial buildings are highly electricity
intensive, with over 75% of the energy consumption arising from electricity, and less than 20% from
natural gas. Only 12% of heating energy demand is sourced from electricity compared to 95% of
cooling energy demand. Therefore, a muted or even negative response of electricity consumption to
heating degree days is not unexpected.
Incorporating lagged price instruments to control for the endogeneity of electricity prices in
column (2) does not significantly change the results, though the price elasticity declines somewhat,
to -0.22, which may be expected if there exists a simultaneity between consumption and the average
price of electricity (see Baltagi et al. (2002)). Incorporating a dummy variable equal to 1 for states
that have adopted a code, in column (3), suggests that having a code in place results is approximately
7% lower electricity demand. Columns (4) and (5) replace the energy code dummy variable with
the construction share variable. The coefficient indicates that in states in which all of the value of
new construction since 1993 is under a code, commercial electricity consumption is lower by about
12%, and the results are unchanged after adding a linear time trend in addition to the time fixed
effects.10
The net contract share variable is incorporated in column (6) to account for the potential impact
of the share of tenants paying their own energy bills on commercial electricity use. A one percentage
point increase in the net contract share is associated with a 1.2% decrease in electricity demand
(significant at the 1% level). Columns (7) and (8) include controls for the stringency (or intensity)
of the standard in place, with and without separate linear time trends for the high and low intensity
of treatment states, respectively. Column (9) controls for the effect of cumulative demand-side
10In addition, the Kleigergen-Paap F statistic is 234.58, which strongly rejects the Stock-Yogo (Stock et al. (2002))
weak identification null hypothesis, and the Hansen J statistic p-value is 0.587, suggesting that the model’s overiden-
tifying restrictions are valid.
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management (DSM) spending per customer. Accounting for all of these variables, the treatment
variable point estimate remains robust. The construction share variable in specification (9) indicates
that in states in which all of the value of new construction since 1993 is under a code, commercial
electricity consumption is lower by about 13%, and the effect is statistically significant at the 5%
level. The treatment intensity variable is positive and statistically significant, and suggests that the
most stringent standard is associated with about a 9% lower electricity demand compared to states
with no standard in place. The net contract share estimate is also essentially unchanged across
specifications.
Simulated energy code savings suggest that increasing energy code stringency from no code
to ASHRAE 2004 would lead to maximum energy savings of approximately 31%. Therefore, the
estimated realized energy savings of 13% are less than half of simulated savings. Further, the point
estimate on the intensity variable suggests that shifting from no standard to ASHRAE 1989 leads to
incremental energy savings of approximately 3%; moving from ASHRAE 1989 to IECC 2000 saves
an additional 1.1%; shifting from ASHRAE 1989 to ASHRAE 1999 leads to savings of 3%; finally,
shifting from ASHRAE 1999 to 2004 leads to incremental savings of just under 3%.
As shown in Column (10), running the full model only using the sample of early and never
adopters results in a 4% higher effect of new construction share on electricity demand, which remains
highly significant, and a positive but insignificant response of standard stringency. The construction
share variable in this sample suggests that in early adopter states in which all of the value of new
construction since 1993 is under a code, commercial electricity consumption is lower by about 17%
relative to states that have never adopted a code. However, as discussed in Section 3, early adopter
and never adopter states differ significantly from each other along many dimensions other than their
adoption of building energy standards. For example, early adopter states have significantly higher
electricity prices and have DSM spending levels over seven times larger than never adopter states.
These differences, as highlighted in Table 3, mean their adoption of energy standards is highly likely
to be endogenous to other characteristics affecting electricity demand. The results from column
(10) therefore bolster the reasons for focusing the analysis on states that were induced to adopt a
standard as a result of the EPAct mandate.
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5.1 CoStar Data Robustness Check
As noted in Section 3, measurement error of the contract variable may cause attenuation bias.
Mismeasurement of the time series of state-level net contract rates measured by the Net variable is
likely to arise for a few reasons. First, most of the change in the share of net contracts rates over
time is likely due to new building construction: new buildings are more likely to be constructed
with installed sub-meters, and owners are therefore more likely to choose net contracts in these
buildings. This is partly due to the fact that rent contracts where tenant don’t pay for utilities
do not incentivize conservation, potentially causing excessive energy consumption and therefore
higher utility bills for owners (Gillingham et al. (2012)). It is costly to install sub-meters in an
existing building (estimates suggest several thousand to over ten thousand dollars, depending on
building size), and many states do not allow cost-recovery charges to be imposed on tenants Utility
Management and Conservation Association (2014).11 The inability to recover submetering costs
disincentivizes submetering investments, particularly if a building was not constructed up front
with a submeter. Instead, a common alternative to submetering and net contracts is a contract
whereby energy costs are prorated over the whole building, either through a charge directly included
in the rent or through monthly payments of average building energy costs. This latter option also
discourages energy conservation, either through free-ridership or more generally by dissasociating
tenants’ energy use decisions and the cost of those decisions. Second, while sub-meter cost recovery
is typically not allowed, state-level legislation over the past twenty-five years has tended to ease other
restrictions on submetering, by simplifying the legal and administrative process building owners and
managers must follow to sub-meter a building (Utility Management and Conservation Association
(2014)). Third, it is possible that owners of sub-metered buildings may decide to switch to a ‘utilities
included’ rent contract, whereby owners pay for utilities. This may be advantageous if owners seek
to benefit from lower utility bills as a result of energy efficiency investments, if they believe they
won’t obtain rent premiums when tenants pay for utilities (Levinson and Niemann (2004), Papineau
(2013)).
On the other hand, a very high degree of mismeasurement in the net contract proxy would
11At present, even states where submetering fees can be charged to tenants (in states other than Utah, Illinois,
Indiana, Maryland, Missouri, Texas and Washington), in many if not most cases permitted fees are typically limited
to administrative costs and any sub metering costs imposed on the landlord by the utility. Therefore, cost recovery
of the initial investment is typically not allowed.
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have to be present in order to significantly affect the widespread cross-sectional variation in net
contract rates exhibited in Figure 6. Much of this cross-sectional variation is likely due to path-
dependent state-level characteristics (Jaffee et al. (2012)). A formal robustness check on the effect
of measurement error in the net contract rate is presented below.
The application of proxies for unobservable variables in regression analysis spans most areas of
economics, with examples ranging from the use of Tobin’s q to proxy for unobservable investment
opportunities in empirical corporate finance (Fazzari et al. (1988), Erickson and Whited (2000)),
to estimating energy savings from market transformation investments using shipments of energy
efficient equipment Horowitz (2004). To assess how measurement error may affect the estimated
net contract coefficient, I implement the minimum distance cumulant estimator from Erickson et
al. (2014). The approach uses the measured data to identify a value for the true coefficient in cases
where measurement error is suspected, and is based on a long history of work in the errors-in-
variables literature (Geary (1942), Pakes (1982), Klepper and Leamer (1984)).
The analysis is implemented assuming that both the net contract and construction share vari-
ables may be measured with error.12 The results are presented in Panel A of Table A1. Since the
cumulant estimator is identified if the mismeasured regressors are non-normally distributed, Panel
B shows the third to sixth higher standardized moments of the contract and construction share vari-
ables. The standardized moments are obtained by scaling each moment by the standard deviation
raised to the corresponding power. As shown, while both variables show modest kurtosis, they are
positively skewed and the fifth and sixth order moments deviate significantly from zero. Normality
tests based on Jacque and Bera (1987), D’agostino et al. (1990), and Royston (1991) strongly reject
the null for both variables.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 5 report OLS results, and column (3) reports the cumulant
estimator results. A fifth-order cumulant estimator was utilized as cumulants beyond the fourth-
order attain the efficiency in finite samples (Dagenais and Dagenais (1997)).13 A comparison of
columns (2) and (3) indicates the cumulant adjustment results in very little change in the estimated
coefficients. In the table, τ1 and τ2 measure the quality of the proxies used to measure the net
12Assuming that only the net contract share variable is mismeasured results in quite similar results, but since the
estimated contract share variable is even larger (in absolute value), the more conservative estimates are reported
here.
13A sixth-order cumulant estimator failed to minimize the objection function in the maximum likelihood estimation.
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contract share and the share of buildings constructed under a code, respectively. According to these
estimates, the net contract and construction shares are very high quality proxies.14
6.Conclusion
While it is well-known that market-based instruments are more cost-effective than standards at
addressing excessive energy consumption due to negative environmental externalities, direct (or
“command and control”) regulatory actions aimed at reducing energy use in several sectors of the
economy have continued to be pursued, and successfully enacted, across the United States and
Canada.15 The persistent popularity of direct regulatory instruments points to the importance of
evaluating the realized effectiveness of the array of environmental regulations that are applied in
practice.
While a few recent studies have assessed the impact of energy codes and demand-side man-
agement on residential and total energy demand (Aroonruengsawat et al. (2012), Arimura et al.
(2012)), the commercial sector has generally not been a focus of energy code evaluations. This is
problematic if policymakers care about crafting policies that differentiate among heterogeneous end-
uses, particularly since recent evidence has shown that commercial energy users’ demand is inelastic
when faced with energy price changes, compared to residential users (Jessoe and Rapson (2013)).
In addition, thus far no studies have assessed the realized impact of tenancy contract structures
on national energy demand, despite evidence suggesting that an increase in the prevalence lease
contracts in which tenants pay their own utilities is likely to mitigate energy use (Levinson and
Niemann (2004), Kahn et al. (2014)).
Using plausibly exogenous variation in energy standard adoptions, as mandated by the 1992
Energy Policy Act (EPAct) in the U.S., I estimate the effectiveness of state-level energy codes and
the share of tenant-paid utility bills at reducing commercial electricity consumption. I find that
in states with a large fraction of post-EPAct new construction under a code, per capita commer-
cial electricity consumption is lower by about 13%. These estimated savings are less than half of
predicted simulated energy standard savings (Hadley and Halverson (1993); Department of Energy
14In empirical corporate finance applications, proxy quality estimates tend to range between 0.2-0.5 (Erickson et
al. (2014)).
15Parry et al. (2010) argue that even if large informational market failures also affect energy use, market-based
instruments are still the preferred policy option.
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(2002); Department of Energy (2008)). The less than predicted savings from energy standard sav-
ings are consistent with previous work based on smaller samples sizes (Nadel and Keating (1991),
Richman et al. (2008)) or for specific states (e.g. Levinson (2013) on California’s residential energy
standard savings). In addition, a one percentage point increase in the rate of tenancy contracts
in which tenants pay directly for energy utilities is associated with a 1% decrease in per capita
electricity demand. The results are robust to controlling for cumulative state-level demand side
management spending and compliance heterogeneity.
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Figure 2: State-Level Adoptions
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Figure 4: Variation in Value Share of Post-EPACT New Construction Value
Selected States, 2010
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Figure 5: Variation in Intensity of Post-EPACT Energy Standards
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Table 1: EPAct States, Early Adopters and Never-Adopters
EPact Non-EPAct
Arkansas (HI) Alabama (NA)
Connecticut (HI) Arizona (NA)
Delaware (HI) California (EA)
Georgia (HI) Colorado (NA)
Idaho (LO) Florida (EA)
Illinois (LO) Indiana (NA)
Iowa (HI) Kansas (NA)
Kentucky (LO) Maine (EA)
Louisiana (HI) Masschusetts (EA)
Maryland (HI) Minnesota (EA)
Michigan (LO) Mississippi (NA)
Nebraska (LO) Missouri (NA)
Nevada (LO) New Hampshire (EA)
New Jersey (HI) New York (EA)
New Mexico (LO) North Dakota (NA)
North Carolina (HI) South Dakota (NA)













Notes: HI = high intensity, denoting states that complied with EPAct before 2002. LO = low intensity, denoting
states that complied in 2002 or later. NA = never-adopter, states that did not comply with EPAct. EA = early
adopter, states that adopted an energy standard before the EPAct mandate came into effect.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics, EPAct Sample
High Intensity (n=324) Low Intensity (n=198) norm. diff.
mean s.d. min max mean s.d. min max
Electricity Consumption 14.37 2.35 8.24 20.68 13.83 2.47 3.99 19.48 0.16
(per capita)
Electricity Consumption 38.74 6.35 22.69 52.47 38.19 7.10 11.44 56.58 0.06
(per service worker)
Electricity Price 22.30 6.36 13.19 50.17 21.02 4.64 12.22 40.77 0.16
($ per mmBTU)
Natural Gas Price 8.10 2.92 3.30 15.58 7.46 2.71 3.27 14.06 0.16
($ per mmBTU)
Per Capita Income 30.49 8.00 16.69 56.96 28.46 6.28 16.55 43.50 0.20
(000s)
Cooling Degree Days 1.09 0.68 0.08 3.10 1.21 0.69 0.21 3.22 -0.11
(000s)
Heating Degree Days 4.85 1.66 1.43 8.84 4.97 1.49 1.51 7.37 -0.05
(000s)
Net Contract Share 55.0 12.8 30.1 77.5 51.0 12.2 29.8 70.0 0.23
New Construction Value Share 0.47 0.33 0 0.91 0.07 0.14 0 0.56 1.12
Building Code Stringency 0.35 0.32 0 1 0.19 0.34 0 1 0.34
Demand-Side Management 0.36 0.37 0.0 1.1 0.08 0.08 0.0 0.23 0.74
Notes: The normalized difference measures the degree of overlap for each covariate across the high and low intensity of




, where X¯i denotes the mean of a given covariate for each treatment
status i = 0, 1, and S2i denotes the sample variance of Xi.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics, Early Adopters and Never-Adopters
Early Adopters (n=126) Never-Adopters (n=180) norm. diff.
mean s.d. min max mean s.d. min max
Electricity Consumption 11.96 2.58 6.77 17.45 15.74 3.51 9.20 27.57 -0.87
(per capita)
Electricity Consumption 31.02 6.91 17.34 48.30 41.97 7.63 25.14 65.22 -1.06
(per service worker)
Electricity Price 30.79 8.04 17.23 49.35 19.91 3.15 14.71 29.83 1.25
($ per mmBTU)
Natural Gas Price 8.90 3.08 3.89 15.51 7.31 2.81 3.59 15.47 0.38
($ per mmBTU)
Per Capita Income 33.67 7.90 18.69 51.90 28.69 7.11 15.43 49.10 0.47
(000s)
Cooling Degree Days 0.97 1.08 0.14 3.88 1.28 0.89 0.13 3.36 -0.22
(000s)
Heating Degree Days 5.51 2.69 0.50 9.59 5.46 2.43 1.68 10.74 0.01
(000s)
Net Contract Share 57.7 10.9 40.6 72.8 41.7 13.9 19.0 68.9 0.91
New Construction Value Share 0.90 0.22 0.0 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.04 4.09
Building Code Stringency 0.45 0.27 0.0 1 0.0 0.06 0.0 0.75 1.63
Demand-Side Management 0.64 0.36 0.13 1.3 0.09 0.09 0.0 0.28 1.48
Notes: The normalized difference measures the degree of overlap for each covariate across the high and low intensity




, where X¯i denotes the mean of a given covariate for each treatment
status i = 0, 1, and S2i denotes the sample variance of Xi. Three never-adopter states do not have data on the net




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Electricity Price -0.0026 -0.0030 -0.0031 -0.0036 -0.0036 -0.0043 -0.0043 -0.0046 -0.0018 -0.024***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Natural Gas Price     0.021**      0.021***      0.021***      0.024***      0.024***      0.019**      0.019**      0.018**      0.018** 0.007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Cooling Degree Days   0.100**   0.101**   0.092**   0.095**   0.093**   0.088*   0.084*   0.080* 0.072 0.064
(0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Heating Degree Days -0.023 -0.023 -0.014 -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 -0.014 -0.015 -0.017 0.016
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.020)
Per Capita Income 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.007 -0.014
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Energy Code Dummy     -0.073***
(0.019)
Contruction Share      -0.122***      -0.122***      -0.139***      -0.091**      -0.136**      -0.130**      -0.169***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.044) (0.062) (0.062) (0.052)
Net Contract Share      -0.012***      -0.011***      -0.010**      -0.011**      -0.024***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Intensity      -0.100**      -0.088**      -0.089**      0.013
(0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.062)
DSM      -0.036**      0.065***
(0.018) (0.023)
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Price Instruments NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time Trend NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
H/L Intensity Trend NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES
Observations 522 522 522 522 522 522 522 522 522 252
R-squared (within) 0.36 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.69
Fixed effects refer to both state and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Robustness to Mismeasurement
Panel A (1) (2) (3)
Electricity Price -0.006* -0.005*     -0.006**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Natural Gas Price 0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Cooling Degree Days   0.067**   0.045**     0.044**
(0.027) (0.019) (0.021)
Heating Degree Days -0.023 -0.028* -0.027*
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
Per Capita Income    0.022**    0.010**     0.011**
(0.009) (0.004) (0.005)
DSM -0.035* -0.029* -0.023
(0.020) (0.017) (0.021)
Intensity -0.067 -0.115* -0.095
(0.055) (0.066) (0.090)
Net Contract Share -0.011 -0.014      -0.015***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.003)
Contruction Share -0.046 -0.051    -0.114**
(0.125) (0.122) (0.054)
τ12    1.00***
(0.205)
τ22    0.87***
(0.221)
Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Time Trend NO YES YES
Cumulant Estimator NO NO YES
Observations 522 522 522
R-squared (within) 0.34 0.36 0.36
Panel B
Standardized Moments Third Fourth Fifth Sixth
Net Contract Share 0.54 6.05 7.10 60.02
Contruction Share -0.63 2.67 -3.87 10.62
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. τ12 and τ22 refer 
to indices of measurement for the proxies of the net contract share and construction
share, respectively. These values lie between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating a worthless
proxy and 1 indicating a perfect proxy.
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